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CONSTITUTIONAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE COURTS
EDWARD CASSEV*
I venture to prophesy that if a poll were taken of the Bench and Bar of
the State of New York, a substantial majority would state that a constitu-
tional court was created in a constitution and a legislative court was created
by a legislative enactment. It is to the examination of the validity of this
distinction that this article is addressed.
Whether or not it is because the necessity for such distinction is rarely
occasioned, it is worthy of note that the writer, after a somewhat diligent
search has found but two courts of last resort-the United States Supreme
Court' and the Court of Appeals in New York 2-which have attempted to
define the two types of courts. Briefly stated, the federal court holds that
a constitutional court is one created in the Constitution or by Congress in
the exercise of the power delegated to it in the judiciary article of the Consti-
tution.3 A legislative court, on the other hand, is one created by Congress
in the exercise of its inherent power when called upon to perform a legisla-
tive duty imposed upon that body by Article II of the Constitution. The
New York Court of Appeals holds that the constitutional courts are those
created in the constitution and that all other courts are legislative courts.
It can readily be discerned that these definitions are irreconcilable.
In The American Insurance Company, et al. v. Canter;1 Chief Justice Mar-
shall states:
"The Judges of the Superior Courts of Florida hold their offices for four
years. These Courts then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judi-
cial power conferred by the constitution on the general government, can be
deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts,
created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the gov-
ernment, or in virtue of that clause which enables congress to make all need-
ful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United
States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a part of that
judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the constitution, hut is
conferred by congress, in the execution of those general powers which that
body possesses over the territories of the United States."5
t Justice of the Municipal Court of the City of New York.
1. American Insurance Company et al. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (U. S. 1323).
2. Haggerty v. City of New York, 267 N. Y. 252, 196 N. E. 45 (1935). The Supreme
Court of Rhode Island also passed upon the question, Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R. L 1,
IS6 At. 332 (1936) and accepted and approved the reasoning of the United State3
Supreme Court and is therefore referred to incidentally in this article.
3. U. S. Co.sT., Art. III.
4. 1 Pet. 511, 546 (U. S. 1823).
5. Florida was a territory in 1828.
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In Haggerty v. City of New York the following definition is set forth:
"The Constitution of the State of New York recognizes two classes of
courts-constitutional courts, and inferior local courts of civil or criminal
jurisdiction. The constitutional courts are those which are created or con-
tinued by the Constitution and, as to these, the Constitution gives certain
power and jurisdiction as well as defining the nature and extent of the office.
The inferior local courts are left to the creation, control and regulation of
and by the Legislature.",
And to make it clear what it means by inferior local courts, the Court of
Appeals states further on:
"The line of cleavage between the constitutional and legislative courts is
clearly drawn by the Constitution of 1925, and it should not become blurred
or obliterated by judicial interpretation."7
Thus did the Court of Appeals put its imprimatur on what the writer
believes is the generally accepted division of courts in this state.8
For more than a century this differentiation set forth by the Supreme Court
in the Ainerican Insurance case between the two types of courts remained
quiescent, or, at least unnoticed in future opinions relative to this subject.0
Then, in the nineteen thirties, a series of decisions dealing with the tenure
of office or the protection from diminution of compensation of certain judi-
cial officers in the federal government and the States of New York and Rhode
Island were handed down. In 1933, Judge O'Donoghue of the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia,10 Judge Hitz of the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia" and Judge Williams of the United States Court of
Claims' 2 appeared as plaintiffs in cases which reached the Supreme Court of
the United States. In two lengthy and exhaustive opinions that body held
that the District of Columbia Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of
6. 267 N. Y. 252, 254, 196 N. E. 45, 46 (1935).
7. Id. at 258, 196 N. E. at 48.
8. So also did another responsible body. In the FOURTni ANNUAL REPORT OV TILE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1938) 151, 166, the term "constitu-
tional court" is constantly used to denote a court created in the constitution.
9. Not only unnoticed but in Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 554, 568 (1933) the
Supreme Court admitted that it had repeatedly failed to follow the American Insurance
case stating: "It must be conceded at the threshold that this court has expressed, more
or less irrelevantly its opinion in the affirmative." The irrelevant expression was in stating
that the Court of Claims was a constitutional court. Cited by the Court as cases in
which such dicta appear are United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 145 (U. S. 1871);
United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 573 (1878) ; Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 386 (1901). But the decision which the court failed to cite as
one of its lapses and which Judge Williams relied upon in his' appeal was Miles v. Graham,
268 U. S. 501, 570 (1925).
10. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933).
11. Ibid. The Hitz case was disposed of in the same opinion as the O'Dontoghtte case.
12. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 554 (1933).
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that District were constitutional courts and that the Court of Claims was a
legislative court. In 1935, the administratrLx of the late Justice Haggerty of
the Municipal Court of the City of New York appeared before the Court
of Appeals which held that the Municipal Court was a legislative court. And
in 1936, in an action involving the tenure of office of Judge Gorham of a
District Court of Rhode Island, the Supreme Court of that State reiterated
and adopted as sound constitutional law the definition of the Aimcrican In-
surance case and held that judge Gorham was an officer of a constitutional
court.13 It would serve, no useful purpose to expatiate upon a detailed
analysis of these cases since we are not interested in the results; rather we
shall confine our discussion to the underlying principles that guided the re-
spective tribunals in determining the basic difference between constitutional
and legislative courts.
Considering the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court held that it was not
a court created pursuant to the power delegated to Congress in Article III;
that Congress had the inherent power to create courts in the exercise of its
legislative power and that since the power to consider claims against the
government was a legislative power, Congress in its exercise could create a
court to assist it even though the power so to create is not explicitly set forth
in the legislative article of the Constitution, the Court stating:
"That judicial power apart from that article [Art. III of the Constitution]
may be conferred by Congress upon legislative courts, as well as upon con-
stitutional courts, is plainly apparent from the opinion of Chief Justice
Marshall in American Insurance Company, et al. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 54t,
dealing with the territorial courts. 'The jurisdiction', he said, 'with which
they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the
3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress in the execu-
tion of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of
the United States.' That is to say (1) that the courts of the territories (and,
of course, other legislative courts) are invested with judicial power, but(2) that this power is not conferred by the third article of the Constitution,
but by Congress in the execution of other provisions of that instrument."' 4
In the case involving the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the
Court stated:
"In American Insurance Company v. Canter, supra, the Chief Justice gave as
a conclusive reason why the territorial courts were not constitutional courts
vested with the judicial power designated in Art. III of the Constitution that
'They are incapable of receiving it.' It is not hard to justify this observation
in respect of courts created for a purely provisional government to serve
between events; but the District Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
are permanent establishments-federal courts of the United States and part
of the federal judicial system."'
13. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R. I. 1, 186 At. 832 (1936).
14. Williams v. United States, 2S9 U. S. 554, 565 (1933).
15. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 544 (1933).
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Thus it can be seen that, in 1933, the Supreme Court returned to the safe
moorings of the philosophy and logic of the American Insurance case. It may
be assumed that it will not again stray from this authority. Two years later,
"the line of cleavage" as set forth above in the Haggerty case was handed
down in New York. Whether it removes the blur on the line is a moot
question.
One need not be informed that the definition in the Haggerty case cannot
be reconciled with that of Chief Justice Marshall. It is apparent that the acid
test in the Federal exposition is the source of the court's judicial power. If
it flows from the judiciary article it is a constitutional court. It matters
not whether it was created in the Constitution or by Congress in the exercise
of the power delegated by the Third article to create other courts. If its
source is the second or legislative article, it is a legislative court.
It is not as simple a task to analyze the definition in the Haggerty case.
First, it must be understood that the judicial power is not vested in the New
York courts in the manner the grant is made to the federal courts.'0 The
Federal Constitution states:
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."' 7
In the New York Constitution the judicial power is not vested in the courts.
Rather a moiety, greater or less, is vested in seven courts, continued and cre-
ated in the Constitution,' 8 which then states:
"Inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established
by the Legislature. . .."10
16. New York is one of the few states wherein the "judicial power" is not vested In
the courts. See Problems Relating to Judicial Organization, 9 Naw YORK STATE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMITTEE (1938) 401, wherein the reasons for this failure
are discussed.
17. U. S. CONST., Art. III, §1.
18. The seven courts are: Court of Appeals, Supreme Court, Appellative Division
of the Supreme Court, County Court, Surrogate Court, Court of General Sessions and
the City Court of City of New York. N. Y. CoNsT., Art. VI, §§ 1-16 incl.
19. N. Y. CoNsT., Art. VI, § 18. There has always been an inaccurate use of the word
"inferior". Inferior to what? All New York courts are inferior, since in none of them
is vested the entire judicial power as it is in the United States Supreme Court. Even
the New York Supreme Court is inferior since it is ". . . continued with general juris-
diction in law and equity, subject to such appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals
as now is or hereafter may prescribed by law not inconsistent with this article." N. Y.
CoNsT., Art. VI, § 1. At most it is a superior court. And if one desired to be dramatic,
it could, in truth, be asserted that a Judge of the Court of Appeals does not possess
the judicial power of a Justice of the Peace. Chief Justice Marshall in Kempe v. Ken-
nedy, 9 U. S. 173 (1809) states: "All courts from which an appeal lies are inferior
courts, in relation to the appellate court before which their judgment may be carried;
but they are not, therefore, inferior courts, in the technical sense of the word."
[Vol. 16
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One can agree with the denomination of the seven courts as constitutional
but, when we are warned not to blur the line of cleavage between them and
all the other courts now existing in this state, we are compelled to group
every court created under the power delegated to the Legislature in the
judiciary article as a legislative court. With such courts, for want of another
classification, must be placed the State Court of Claims. But we are left to
conjecture whether the latter is created as an inferior local court pursuant
to this section. And there is the rub. The Constitution in delegating the
power to create inferior courts states2 0 they must (1) be local, (2) not be
courts of record, and (3) have jurisdiction no greater than the County
Court ($3000). The present Court of Claims was created subsequent to the
adoption of that provision yet we find the statute (1S97) creating it vio-
lates these provisions.2 1
The history of the Court of Claims demonstrates that, when it was created,
the Legislature knew it had the inherent power to create that type of court
dehors -the power to create inferior local courts granted in the judiciary arti-
cle. And the Court of Appeals recognized that inherent power when it stated
that neither the Board of Claims created by Chapter 205 of the Laws of
1883, nor the Court of Claims created by Chapter 36 of the Laws of 1897,
was a court or judicial body within the terms of the meaning of the judiciary
article of the State Constitution.2
This being so, how shall the State Court of Claims be typed? The
answer, I repeat, is insoluble. Perhaps like a judicial Ishmael, it must
wander in outer darkness until a classification is devised to give it a legal-
istic standing.23 That it is the only legislative court in the judicial system
20. N. Y. Co.;sT., Art. VI, § IS.
21. N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 36.
22. People ex rel. Swift v. Luce, 204 N. Y. 478, 97 N. E. 850 (1912).
23. This is not a mere figure of speech. If it cannot be cla-sificd under the courts
created under § 18 of Article IV of the New York Constitution, a new classification must
be devised if the division of courts laid down in the Haggcrty case are followed. Perhaps
the best example of the failure to understand the basic difference between the two tpes
of courts appears in the Haggerty opinion at page 250), where it states: "Reference should
be made to the rulings of the United States Supreme Court regarding this matter of in-
ferior local courts under the Federal Constitution. In Wilhirns v. Urited States (2S9
U. S. 553) it was held that the judicial power of the Court of Claims is not vestcd
in virtue of Article III of the Constitution, so as to bring the judges within the pro-
tection of that article as to tenure of office and compensation!' Note the word local".
The Federal Court of Claims is not a local court. Its gcographical jurizdiction is co-
terminus with that of the Supreme Court. Further you would be led to believe that
because it is an "inferior local" court its judicial power is not vested in virtue of Arti-
cle MI when the fact is, as we have previously seen, its judicial power is not vected
in virtue of Article IM-. but in virtue of Article II, which the Haggcrty case overlooks.
Had the court read the O'Donoghue case which is reported immediately before the
Wil ams case in 289 U. S. at 516 (1933), it would have found that the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia, admittedly an inferior local court is vested with its judi-
cial power in virtue of Article M and its judges are brought within the protection of
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of New York, if the reasoning of the American Insurance case is applied, is
apparent.
The failure to comprehend or indicate the true nature of a Court of Claims
was not confined to judicial interpretation as set forth in the Itaggerty case.
Section 23, Article VI of the New York Constitution of 1925, states:
"Nothing in this article contained shall abridge the authority of the legisla-
ture to create or abolish any board or court with jurisdiction to hear and
audit or determine claims against the state, and any such tribunal existing
when this article shall take effect shall be continued with the powers then
vested in it until otherwise provided by law."'24
Now it is submitted that this affirmation of the right of the Legislature is
an act of supererogation in that the right had theretofore been exercised by
that body and had never been challenged but had been upheld in People ex rel.
Swift v. Luce.m This is not a criticism of deep import but the genesis of the
section and its inclusion in the judiciary article is something else. The Legis-
lature had created a Judiciary Constitutional Convention 20 in 1921 to submit
proposed amendments to the judiciary article, yet we find that body submit-
ting an amendment which, if it has any place in the Constitution, should
have been included in the legislative article for, as has been noted above,
it is the affirmation of the right of the Legislature to create a legislative
court.
2 7
There is something else that should be discussed at this point. I refer
to the inexact use of the word "statutory" as being synonymous with "legis-
lative."2 8 It is correct to say that all legislative courts are statutory courts
but all statutory courts are not legislative courts. Nowhere has this been
clearer put than in the minority opinion in the Rhode Island case:
"It is true that they are brought into existence by legislative enactment,
Article III because it was established in virtue of that article. Thus the test Is not
whether a court is inferior or local, but under which article it was created.
24. For the reasons why this section was proposed and adopted, see Supplemenioi
Report of the Executive Committee, JUDICIARY CONSTITUTIONAL. CONVWTIoN or 1921,
LEGISLATIVE DOCUM'ENT (1922) No. 67, at 11.
25. 204 N. Y. 478, 97 N. E. 850 (1912).
26. At the risk of appearingPdidactic but merely to emphasize the recurrent misuse
of words the Constitutional Convention should have been named a commission. Con-
ventions are called pursuant to N. Y. CONST., Art. XIV, § 2.
27. As an amendment to Art. 3, § 19, which the Convention, be it noted, was not
empowered to propose.
28. It appears in Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 554, 570 (1933), where the
court states: ". . . nor does it [Miles v. Graham (1925)] show that the Court's atten-
tion was drawn to the question of whether that court [Court of Claims] is a statutory
court or a constitutional court." Justice Sutherland in writing this failed to note that
a court can be both statutory and constitutional. Yet in the O'Donoghue opinion handed
down the same day, the same Justice emphasized the fact that the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia was both a statutory and a constitutional court. It makes for
confusion worse confounded.
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and that, because of this fact, they may be loosely termed statutory courts,
but when they are so instituted the judicial power of the state is vested in
them by the Constitution, which makes them constitutional courts in the
strict sense of the term." 29
At the risk of being charged with lMse vuzjestM, I believe that Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's denomination of courts established under the judiciary arti-
cle as constitutional courts is not sufficiently descriptive. A truer appellation
would be to call them judiciary courts. Then, when referred to, the title
would indicate the constitutional article by virtue of which they were estab-
lished. We might then call both judiciary and legislative courts constitu-
tional courts for the power to create both types of courts, explicitly granted
in the judiciary article and implicitly possessed in the legislative article
flows from the same source, the Constitution itself.
Nor can I agree with Chief Justice Marshall when he states that a legis-
ative court "... . is incapable of receiving .. ." the judicial power.? A court,
no matter whence the source of its creation, can receive but one power-
the judicial power; certainly not the executive or legislative power. What the
Chief Justice h~d in mind, I believe, when he stated that only the courts
created under the judiciary article were capable of receiving the judicial
power was that these were the courts vested with the power to administer
the common and chancery law as it was received by us from England and
subsequently modified by statute. This, one can readily perceive, is a blanket
grant whereas the grant to legislative courts is severely restricted to aid in
the execution of a legislative duty.-
29. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R. I. 1, 19, 186 All. 832, 869 (1936) disenting opinion.The exposition on the two types of courts in the Rhode Island case is exhaustive and
illuminating. Although there was a disagreement it was not on the basic distinction but
on the interpretation of constitutional provisions of the constitution of Rhode kland.
So also the dissent in the O'Donoglue case was not on the definitive chaacteristics of
courts. The prevailing opinion in the Rhode Island case made another novel division.
It held that the only true legislative court is the territorial court and that the others
(Court of Claims, Court of Customs Appeals) are ". . . tribunals created by Congrez3
under its general legislative power, to perform administrative or quasi-judicil functions.'
Id. at 9, 186 Atl. at S49. The federal court does not make this distinction.
30. Justice Sutherland in the Williams case, as noted previously, states it correctly
when he says: "The courts of the territories . . . are invested with judicial power but
that this power is not conferred by the third article..." Williams v. United States,
239 U. S. 554, 565 (1933).
31. In the American Insurance case, we find Chief justice Marshall making this
observation: "If we have recourse to that pure fountain from which all the juriz-dic-
tion of the Federal Courts is derived, we find language employed which cannot well
be misunderstood. The constitution declares that 'the judicial power sLl extend to all
cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties made, or which shall be made, under this authority." American Insurance
Co. et al. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 544 (U. S. 1328). The fact is this "pure fountain"
supplies the judicial power in a strictly limited amount to the legislative courts, once
19471
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When the American Insurance case came before him, Chief Justice Marshall
recognized that Congress must have the power to create courts in terri-
tories if it were to execute effectively the ". . . power to dispose and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States ...,,a2 but that the power vested in such
courts was not the judicial power referred to in: Article III. He recognized
that the framers of the Constitution had failed to envision the necessity for
such a court and he found the power when the need was apparent, as was
his wont.P It is also to be noted that the federal government has a special
and important interest in legislative courts. In the Courts of Customs Ap-
peals and the Court of Claims the government is the defendant. No citizen
can sue another in these courts. He is relegated to the courts created under
the judiciary article. It is true that a citizen can sue another citizen in a ter-
ritorial court but it is a court of limited tenure to be abolished when the ter-
ritory is admitted to the Union as a state.
It might be interesting, if not profitable, to speculate on the underlying
reasons which have given the sanction of judicial approval to the manifestly
artificial and illogical division of the two types in New York. To the writer
there appear to be current two underlying assumptions that tave contributed
to the bringing about of this untenable position. The first is that the power,
the right, to render judgments by courts created in the Constitution is some-
thing different than that which gives life to the courts created by the legis-
lature under the judiciary article; that they and their judgments partake of
a sacerdotal character; or, in other words, it is the failure to recognize that
the judicial power vested in' the one is the same as that vested in the other.
The second is the tyranny, or should I less severely say, the cult 4 of words
and a failure to understand their true content. A court is created by a legis-
lature; ergo, it is a legislative court. A court is created by statute; ergo, it is
a statutory court and can't possibly be constitutional. A court is inferior; ergo,
its judgments are of an inferior quality. It finally results in the veneration of
the shadow of words without a thought to the substance of their content.
In conclusion this may be observed. If consistency is a jewel, it might be
well if those charged with interpreting the judicial procedtires had that
precept in mind. We have heretofore noted that the yardstick in determining
the right to create them is granted, as surely as it supplies the constitutional courts
in an unlimited amount.
32. U. S. CONST., Art. IV, § 3.
33. There is growing, particularly in Washington, a belief that a new type to be
called the Executive Court is coming into existence. It functions now under the guise of
a bureau in the opinion of many students of the subject. The Tax Court is a true
executive Court.
34. I commend the reader to a reading of Judge Frank's essay on Tuz CULT Or TnE
ROBE, SAT. REViEW OF LITERATURE, Oct. 13, 1945, p. 12; N. Y. L. J., March 2, 4, 1946,
pp. 838, 856, col. 1, wherein he maintains that a gown neither increases the power, aug-
ments the intelligence nor enhances the dignity of the wearer.
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the constitutionality of a court is the place of its inception, not the source
of its power, at least so far as New York is concerned. Whether we agree
with this postulate is of no avail. It is the adjective law of this state. Yet
we find the same tribunal that set forth this standard of demarcation using
a different test in determining the constitutionality of a legislative body. In
People ex rel. Deitz v. Hogan 5 it was held that the Board of Mdermen of
the City of New York was a constitutional body not because it was created
in the Constitution, which it assuredly was not, but because it was vested
with the legislative power to create Assembly districts out of Senatorial
districts.30 Thus the test of the constitutionality of a body was shifted from
the source of its inception to the source of a particular power. I leave it to
others to harmonize these two conflicting approaches to the answer to the
same question.
This, at least, can be maintained. If the reasoning employed in the Dcilz
case was the rationale of the Haggerty case it is obvious that the Municipal
Court of the City of New York would be held to be a constitutional court
for, as the writer sees it, such is the philosophic background of the Ancrican
Insurance case.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN NEW YORK AS AFFECTING CON.
TRACTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF CO1 1ISSIONS
A number of recent New York decisions have created some doubts as to the
effect of the Statute of Frauds on certain types of employer-employee con-
tracts, particularly those relating to the payment of commissions. A review
of the cases in the light of their historical background will not entirely resolve
the doubts, but it may serve at least to outline an area in which inconsisten-
cies appear.
The section of the New York Statute with which we are concerned' is as
follows:
"Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking:
"1. By its terms is not to be performed within one year from the ma1ing thereof
or the performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime ...
The Historical Backgrotad
This section stems directly from the corresponding portion of the original
Statute of Frauds2 except for the last sixteen words quoted, which bring life-
35. 214 N. Y. 216, 222, 10S N. E. 459, 463 (1915).
36. N. Y. Coxsr., Art. m, § 5.
i. N. I. Pans. Prop. L.w § 31(1).
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